The enduring legacy of these top-down efforts is evident today in phenomena like the “Pig Pen Project” and “Eagle AI” software, which streamline mass voter challenges, often targeting minority communities. While there’s no evidence to support claims of widespread voter fraud, these tactics, including calls for new voting restrictions, continue to fuel election-related lawsuits and political battles, particularly in swing states like Arizona and Michigan, underscoring how historical actions continue to shape contemporary American voting dynamics.

In the tumultuous landscape of American politics, the battles over who votes and how communities build power are as old as the republic itself. Yet, the roots of today’s most fervent electoral disputes often lie in seemingly distant historical events, unfolding in specific locales that, over time, become pivotal battlegrounds. This is the story of two such places – Arizona and Michigan – and how events decades ago, one concerning a future Supreme Court justice and the other an immigrant community’s struggle, laid the groundwork for the political dynamics we witness today.

The fight to control the vote is more intense than ever. From presidential pronouncements about “voter ID” and “proof of citizenship” to accusations of “widespread voter fraud” and efforts to inject “chaos and doubt” into the election system, the integrity and accessibility of the ballot box remain fiercely contested. At the same time, the power of grassroots organizing, born from community struggles, continues to demonstrate its ability to sway elections and reshape political landscapes. These two narratives, one of top-down attempts to manage the electorate and the other of bottom-up movements forging political influence, reveal the deep historical currents that converge in our modern electoral moment.

The summer of 1986 saw William Rehnquist’s Senate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. Amidst the usual scrutiny of a judicial nominee, some of the most dramatic moments didn’t focus on his 14 years as an associate justice, but on events from his life years before he ever wore a judge’s robe. The allegations stemmed from his time as an attorney living in Phoenix, Arizona, in the 1960s.

Witnesses testified to seeing Rehnquist, then a well-known attorney, at polling places in the early 1960s. Their accounts painted a picture of Rehnquist challenging the eligibility of voters, particularly Black and minority citizens. One witness vividly recalled Rehnquist approaching a Black gentleman in line and asking, “Pardon me, are you a qualified voter?” When the man affirmed, Rehnquist pressed, “Do you have any credentials to indicate that you are?” Upon receiving a negative response, Rehnquist concluded, “Well, then perhaps there’s a question whether or not you’re qualified.” Other witnesses described Rehnquist asking voters to “read a card, read something from the Constitution.”

During the hearings, Rehnquist vehemently denied harassing or intimidating voters, stating, “Yes, I do deny that. I deny that.” However, he did acknowledge providing legal advice to Republicans who were challenging voter eligibility at the polls and admitted to showing up at polling places himself. He termed it an “election day program,” while others referred to it as a “ballot security program.”

To understand Rehnquist’s actions, one must look to his deeply entrenched conservative philosophy. Born in 1924 in Shorewood, Wisconsin, Rehnquist’s early life revealed an ideological purist. As a high school senior during World War II, he organized patriotic assemblies and even signed up to be a “black captain” to report subversive activity to the FBI. After graduating first in his class from Stanford Law and clerking for Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Rehnquist’s conservative leanings became evident.

In 1952, during his clerkship, Rehnquist penned a controversial memo to Justice Jackson regarding Brown v. Board of Education. In it, he argued against the majority, suggesting a “more principled stand.” A later phone conversation with journalist John A. Jenkins, who was writing a profile on Rehnquist, revealed another memo from that era concerning a voting rights case. Jenkins read an excerpt: “It is about time the court faced the fact that the white people on the south in the south you men I assume don’t like the colored people. The constitution restrains them from affecting this dislike through state action. But it most assuredly did not appoint the court as a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head.” Rehnquist would later try to deflect these views, claiming they reflected Jackson’s, not his own, but to many, his cards were shown. He believed integration was a matter of personal choice and state, not federal, prerogative—a classic conservative position.

Rehnquist’s move to Phoenix, Arizona, a “frontier town” in the 1950s, was driven by a desire for warmth. There, his conservative philosophy, already “fully baked,” found fertile ground. As Phoenix grappled with Jim Crow laws and the burgeoning civil rights movement, Rehnquist became a vocal conservative voice, opposing anti-discrimination ordinances. He gained notice and was encouraged to enter politics, which often meant scrutinizing voters in Democratic-leaning precincts. Republicans at the time believed many votes were cast illegally, pointing to alleged issues like using vacant lots for addresses or insufficient residency.

To challenge these voters, Republicans would target mailings to predominantly communities of color in Democratic precincts. If mail was returned as undeliverable, challengers would be dispatched to the polls to question voter eligibility. This strategy culminated on November 6, 1962, election day, at an elementary school named after civil rights leader Mary McLeod Bethune. The precinct was predominantly Hispanic and Black. Two white Republican voter challengers, allegedly including Rehnquist, “confronted black and minority voters,” displaying cards with constitutional excerpts and demanding they read aloud to prove literacy. This activity, as an FBI background investigation later noted, “discouraged the black voters who then did not vote.” The day escalated into a “flurry of fists,” though Rehnquist denied direct involvement in the scuffle.

The strategy, as revealed in an FBI interview, was to “clog polls in heavily minority Democratic precincts by sending an army of challengers… at peak voting periods and thereby intimidate some voters and scare them away from voting or frustrate voters by causing such a time delay that they would give up and leave without voting.” What was happening in Phoenix was a field test for something much bigger.

Two years later, in 1964, the “election day program” went national. William Rehnquist was part of the “Arizona mafia,” a political powerhouse that included Barry Goldwater, a senator who had become a popular voice advocating individual freedoms and limited federal government. Goldwater, like Rehnquist, opposed social welfare programs and believed school integration should be left to the states. Rehnquist even convinced Goldwater to vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which would become law that summer.

With Lyndon Baines Johnson pushing his “Great Society” agenda, the momentum was with the Democrats. However, the National Republican Party had a plan: Operation Eagle Eye. Its director, Charles Barr, openly told the media, including the New York Times, that he expected to “challenge or deter from voting 1.25 million voters all across the country.” This was a direct response to Republican claims that the 1960 election had been stolen.

Operation Eagle Eye replicated the Phoenix blueprint: send mailers to Democratic precincts, and if they bounced back, challenge those voters at the polls. On election day 1964, the New York Times reported 100,000 trained Republican workers were deployed in 35 key cities. The media documented the immediate impact: “Voters by the hundreds perplexed and downright scared were snarled yesterday in partisan poll watching,” reported the Miami Herald. Democrats released campaign ads calling it “Operation Evil Eye.” The FBI was asked to investigate complaints of anonymous phone calls warning Mexicans and Negroes of challenges.

Goldwater ultimately lost the election in a landslide to Johnson. Rehnquist, who even wrote Goldwater’s concession speech, was one of the few who remained by his side. Goldwater’s presidential run marked the height of his national fame, but for William Rehnquist, it was just the beginning of a “long game.” He was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1971 and later became Chief Justice in 1986. During his confirmation hearings, new witnesses came forward with eyewitness accounts of his voter challenging activities, but it was his word against theirs.

Rehnquist served on the Supreme Court for 33 years until his death in 2005, becoming one of the most successful Chief Justices. He remained true to his conservative values, overseeing a court that struck down more federal laws than any previous one. Notably, in 2000, he was part of the majority that ended the Florida election recount, handing the presidency to Republican George W. Bush.

Today, the legacy of Rehnquist’s “election day program” and Operation Eagle Eye reverberates. Maricopa County, Arizona, once Rehnquist’s political proving ground, has become a hotbed for election fraud conspiracies, especially after flipping for Joe Biden in 2020. The concept of mass voter challenges has evolved, with technologies like “Eagle AI” software promising to “streamline and speed up the process, creating challenges at volume.” Despite the absence of evidence for widespread voter fraud claims by Republicans regarding the 2020 election, efforts to restrict voting rules, such as mail-in ballots, continue. These top-down strategies, aimed at controlling the vote, remain a central feature of American electoral politics.

While Arizona grappled with voter challenges, Michigan, another crucial swing state, saw a different kind of power being built – from the bottom up. The state, which flipped for Trump in 2016, then Biden in 2020, and back to Trump in 2024 (as projected in the original video’s context), is a testament to its battleground reputation. A key demographic in this electoral seesaw is the Arab American community. Though not the largest voting bloc, their numbers, around 400,000 residents, can decide statewide elections.

The foundation of this political power lies in decades of community organizing, rooted in labor activism. The story begins in Dearborn, a city just outside Detroit, where thousands of Arab Americans settled, many drawn by the promise of work at the Ford Rouge factory. Ismael Ahmed, who arrived in the US at age 10, saw his family find community in Detroit by the 1950s. The South End neighborhood of Dearborn, a “little sliver of land” between the Ford Rouge factory and Detroit, became a thriving blend of Lebanese, Yemeni, Polish, Italian, Irish, and German immigrants.

The Ford Rouge plant, the largest industrial complex in the world at its height with 90,000 workers, was the magnet. As Sally Howell, a professor of history at the University of Michigan, Dearborn, explains, “It was the auto industry that pulled these Arab Americans just like it pulled so many other immigrants to Detroit.”

However, this idyllic community faced threats. The Edward C. Levy Company, which processed Ford’s byproducts into asphalt, drove large, open-bed trucks spewing industrial waste through the South End. Residents protested, leading the city administration to consider a drastic solution: rezoning the neighborhood for heavy industry, effectively pushing out the residents and expanding the industrial footprint. Dearborn’s Arab Americans knew they had to fight back. They formed human chains, blocking bulldozers sent to tear down homes, “really trying to defend the neighborhood one block at a time or one house at a time.”

Simultaneously, Arab auto workers in the factories were confronting “horrible” working conditions: 10-hour days, seven-day weeks, and severe injuries. Arab and African American workers often held the worst jobs and faced discrimination. This shared struggle fostered solidarity. During the Civil Rights Movement, Detroit became a hotbed of Black activism, with movements like the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers organizing for better conditions and rights for Black workers. These movements extended their organizing to include Arab auto workers, forging a powerful alliance within the factories.

By the 1970s, Dearborn’s Arab American community had grown and diversified, influenced by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and conflicts in the Middle East, particularly the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The community began to transpose the overseas conflict onto their local struggle against displacement, creating a powerful sense of collective identity and purpose. In 1971, they took their fight to the courts, securing a huge victory in August 1973 when a district judge ruled that the city had taken their property “without due process of law.”

Just months later, the 1973 Yom Kippur War erupted, rocking the Arab American community globally and locally. Dearborn’s Arab Americans, with their established organizing infrastructure from the South End fight, mobilized. Ismael Ahmed and other activists formed the Arab Workers Caucus, holding its first meeting with 70 representatives from nearly every auto plant in Detroit. Their focus: the funding of what they saw as the “murder of their brothers and sisters back home.”

They discovered that their local UAW (United Auto Workers) union had invested over $300,000 in Israeli bonds, with the national union holding even more. This meant Arab American UAW members were indirectly supporting Israel in a conflict they viewed as a violent occupation. The Caucus demanded divestment, arguing in a Detroit Free Press ad that “Purchase of Israeli bonds is regarded by these workers similarly as would a UAW investment in racist South Africa would be regarded by black workers.”

When petitions to the UAW yielded no progress, the Caucus planned a “wildcat strike”—a strike without union permission—to coincide with an awards ceremony for UAW President Leonard Woodcock. For a month, they organized across plants, distributing flyers and placing ads. On November 28, 1973, around 2,000 workers at the Dodge Main plant walked out. Crucially, it wasn’t just Arab workers; Black workers joined, showcasing “black brown solidarity.” Protesters picketed Woodcock’s award ceremony, chanting “No more bombs! No more bonds!”

The wildcat strike was a significant risk for the workers, threatening their jobs and livelihoods. Yet, their collective action left its mark. The sheer scale of the protest meant mass firings of critical workers would have been too disruptive for the UAW. Following the strike, the UAW began to engage more with the Caucus, eventually selling off some of its Israeli bonds. Ismael Ahmed Jr. noted that the strike was “an incredibly empowering moment in the history of Arab American activism. It was the Arab community becoming its own and being recognized as a political force.”

This newfound power translated into direct political action. Arab Americans began running for city council and school board, demanding that the city address the needs of their growing immigrant community. Over half a century, Ismael Ahmed Sr. (who passed away in January 2024) witnessed his community transform into a driving political force. In 2023, Dearborn became the first Arab-majority city in the US. Today, “there’s not a ticket in Michigan that doesn’t have an Arab American on it ever. It’s just part of the formula.” The long-term impact was underscored in June 2024, when the UAW passed a resolution to officially divest from Israel, fulfilling a demand first made by Arab American auto workers almost 60 years ago.

The stories of William Rehnquist’s ballot security programs in Arizona and the Arab American wildcat strike in Michigan offer contrasting yet interconnected insights into the enduring nature of American political power. From the top-down efforts to control access to the ballot box, a strategy that continues to evolve with new technologies and claims of fraud, to the bottom-up movements that coalesce around shared struggles for justice and representation, these historical “seeds” continue to shape the American electoral landscape. Understanding these past battles is not merely an academic exercise; it is essential to grasping the complex, often contentious, political dynamics that define our present and will undoubtedly influence our future.

This leaves Saudi Arabia with dire options: a costly military re-engagement with the Houthis or unappealing diplomatic negotiations, neither of which guarantee stable oil flow. The US has declined Saudi requests for direct military intervention, leaving the kingdom isolated. Consumers should brace for continued and potentially worsening pain at the pump, as the war’s true economic costs, previously masked by Saudi Arabia’s workaround, are now becoming starkly evident, with global protests already erupting over rising fuel costs.

For many, the price at the gas pump is a daily reminder of global instability, a financial pressure point that often feels disconnected from the headlines. Back in March, as the war with Iran intensified, gas station owner Cam Judy in Florida echoed the sentiment of countless drivers: “I would love for this to be over next week and I go back to $2.79 a gallon. That’d be awesome.” He hoped, like many, that the surge was temporary, a fleeting consequence of a conflict far away.

But just a few weeks later, Cam’s hope turned to bewilderment. He texted producers at The Daily, reporting a “wild thing” happening at his pumps. One day, his regular gas was $3.99 a gallon. The next morning, his beer distributor informed him that every other station had jumped to $4.19. “There’s no way,” Cam remembered thinking. But a quick check confirmed it: a shocking 20-cent overnight increase. His customers, equally baffled, asked the same question: “What’s going on with these gas prices?”

This time, Cam had no easy answer. The initial understanding of the war’s impact on the Strait of Hormuz, a critical oil chokepoint, had settled into a stalemate. The news cycle had moved on, and the direct connection between the conflict and pump prices seemed to have faded. Yet, the prices were climbing again, seemingly without a clear cause. Cam’s frustration was palpable: “I just wish as a regular average Joe citizen, I would like to know why. And I think a lot of my customers would also like to know why.”

The answer, it turns out, lies in a complex and rapidly escalating geopolitical shift, one that has effectively severed Saudi Arabia’s crucial oil export lifelines and profoundly altered the global energy landscape.

For months, the US and Iran had been locked in a tense stalemate, with the Strait of Hormuz serving as the primary symbol of the conflict’s threat to global oil supplies. While this “stranglehold” on the Strait did send initial prices soaring, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, had largely remained on the sidelines. Despite being a US ally and geographically close to the conflict, it wasn’t being hit as hard as other Gulf states like the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, or Bahrain. Many observers wondered why Iran seemed to be easing its pressure on the kingdom.

The truth, as revealed by Vivian Nerim reporting from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was that Iran was holding a strategic “card,” waiting for the opportune moment to play it. That moment has now arrived, fundamentally reshaping the dynamics of the war and its ripple effects on global energy markets.

Saudi Arabia’s initial relative immunity from the worst impacts of the Strait of Hormuz blockade was due to a clever, long-standing workaround. Decades ago, the kingdom had built a gigantic oil pipeline stretching all the way across the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea. This “East-West pipeline” was an insurance policy against potential disruptions in the Gulf, allowing Saudi oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reach global customers via the Red Sea.

This strategic alternative meant that while other Gulf states faced significant disruptions, Saudi Arabia’s supply to global markets was much less affected. However, this critical workaround has now been targeted, not directly by Iran, but by its powerful ally in Yemen: the Houthis.

To understand the current crisis, one must grasp the history and motivations of the Houthis. This group, an Iranian ally in Yemen, began as a ragtag religious movement in northern Yemen, but rose to become increasingly important power players starting in 2014. Following a complicated and failed “Arab Spring” transition in Yemen, the Houthis swept into the capital, Sanaa, routing the internationally recognized government and pushing them further south.

This ignited a brutal civil war in 2015, prompting Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s northern neighbor, to intervene. The Saudis, nervous about an Iran-backed militia taking over territory on their border, launched a disastrous bombing campaign to try and restore the government and push back the Houthis. The conflict became a fragmented, complicated civil war that eventually reached a stalemate in 2022 with a UN-backed truce.

However, the Houthis remained frustrated. They sought a political agreement that would recognize their power and grant them access to oil resources, which they currently lack due to the territories they control. This internal pressure converged with the external interests of their backers in Iran. Within Iran, a faction of “hardliners” had been gaining leverage, pushing for escalation in the war with the US to exert pressure on the global economy and energy markets. This “collision of mutual interests” between frustrated Houthis and hawkish Iranian hardliners set the stage for the latest, most impactful escalation.

The escalation began subtly but decisively. In July, the Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, vowing to prevent any Saudi ships from passing through the Red Sea. This triggered a period of heightened tensions, with Saudi Arabia initiating airstrikes in Yemen and increased ground fighting. However, neither side seemed eager for a full-blown war.

This delicate balance shattered last week. The Houthis launched a concerted push towards the Red Sea coast, assailing Yemeni territories that are gateways to the Bab al-Mandab Strait – a critical chokepoint at the opening of the Red Sea. What initially seemed like a protracted battle quickly crumbled. Government soldiers retreated rapidly, and the Houthis seized a vast, strategic swath of Yemeni territory along the Red Sea, effectively gaining control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

To compound the disaster for Saudi Arabia, on the very same day the Houthis secured this strategic control, Saudi Arabia announced that its crucial cross-country East-West pipeline, its primary workaround for oil exports, had been attacked and forced to shut down.

The consequences are stark: “As of now, essentially, all of the exits for oil from the Arabian Peninsula have been severely choked off or just cut off.” This leaves Saudi Arabia with virtually no viable options for getting its oil to global markets, and the impact is already being felt worldwide.

For Saudi Arabia, this is an existential crisis. The kingdom’s entire economy, government budget, and even payments to royal family members are inextricably linked to oil revenue. Their ambitious plans to diversify away from oil and transform into a tourism and business hub also rely heavily on these same oil revenues. Without a way to export oil, the very foundation of the kingdom’s political and economic system is at risk.

Their options are grim:

1. Return to War with the Houthis: This is a highly unattractive prospect. Their previous intervention in Yemen proved disastrous, resulting in a brutal and grinding civil war with no clear victory. A renewed military campaign would be costly, potentially prolonged, and carries no guarantee of success.
2. Seek a Diplomatic Solution: Negotiating an agreement with the Houthis is also fraught with difficulty. Past negotiations have shown the Houthis to be a group with maximalist demands, unwilling to back down easily. Now, feeling empowered and holding the upper hand, their demands are likely to be even greater. There’s no guarantee of a sustainable agreement, and the Houthis could renege on any deal in the future.

Given Saudi Arabia’s predicament, it’s natural to wonder about the role of its most powerful ally, the United States. Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has reportedly approached the Trump administration multiple times, including recently, to request US assistance in a fight against the Houthis.

However, President Trump has reportedly declined. While some intelligence sharing continues, there is no evidence of stepped-up US military involvement, such as airstrikes. The US seems to hold the mindset that this is a problem for Saudi Arabia to “sort out.”

The US’s reluctance, despite Saudi Arabia being a vital ally and the Houthis being backed by an enemy, stems from several factors. The US is already stretched thin by its ongoing war with Iran. Furthermore, past US military engagements against the Houthis, such as a brief and “ill-fated” air strike campaign last year, have shown that a military solution against them is elusive. As Trump has reportedly suggested, the Houthis don’t seem interested in fighting the US, only Saudi Arabia. Engaging in another war against a resilient militia that has consistently defied more powerful foes is not seen as a “winning prospect” for the US.

From Riyadh, Vivian Nerim describes a “weird moment” in Saudi Arabia. While the Houthis are attacking the kingdom, the impact hasn’t yet reached major cities like Riyadh. There’s an effort to maintain a sense of normalcy, with conferences and tourism events still being planned. Yet, everyone knows they are “potentially on the verge of another war.”

The damaged East-West pipeline’s repair timeline remains a mystery, dependent on the extent of the damage. Even if repaired quickly, the fundamental risk remains: as long as conflict persists and foes are willing and able to attack, the pipeline remains vulnerable. A quick repair could be followed by another attack the very next day.

This latest escalation, while perhaps surprising to some, was arguably foreseeable for strategic war gamers. Gulf Arab states, as American allies hosting US bases and companies, have long understood their vulnerability as front-line targets if Iran were to launch retaliatory attacks against the United States. Their crucial oil and gas resources are the most strategic and easiest way for Iran to exert pressure on distant adversaries. Many Gulf leaders had tried to prevent this war precisely because they knew they would be on the front lines.

The consequences extend far beyond the gas pump. The early months of the war, with Saudi Arabia’s workaround, had masked the true cost of the conflict on oil and gas prices. That masking effect is now gone. The renewed full-blown war in Yemen also threatens to unleash devastating humanitarian consequences for tens of millions of people already enduring one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

Around the globe, the impact is already tangible. As oil prices surged past $100 a barrel, protests erupted: fishermen clashed with police in France, frustrated drivers blocked roads in Portugal, and in Syria, where fuel prices were raised twice in two weeks, protesters blocked major highways with flaming tires. Syrian government officials cited the war as the reason for their unavoidable price hikes.

The spiraling consequences of the US-Iran conflict are having devastating impacts on the global economy and people’s ability to afford essential goods and energy. What’s becoming increasingly clear is that these are not problems that will disappear quickly. They are complicated, deeply entrenched, and could very well be long-lasting. The unseen hand of a distant war is now undeniably reaching into the pockets of everyday citizens, demanding a clearer understanding of its complex, far-reaching implications.

이러한 역사적 맥락은 유권자 참여를 억제하려는 시도가 특정 개인의 이념적 신념과 결합하여 어떻게 조직적인 정치 전략으로 발전하고, 수십 년이 지난 후에도 선거 결과에 영향을 미치는지를 시사한다. 특히 렌퀴스트의 사례는 보수적 가치관을 가진 인물이 사법부 최고위직에 오르면서도 그의 과거 행적이 선거 시스템의 신뢰성에 대한 지속적인 논란을 야기할 수 있음을 보여준다. 시청자들은 현재 진행 중인 선거 관련 소송과 유권자 투표권 제한 시도들을 과거의 ‘오퍼레이션 이글 아이’와 같은 맥락에서 이해하고, 유권자 억압 전략이 현대 기술(예: 이글 AI 소프트웨어)을 통해 어떻게 진화하고 있는지 인지하며, 민주주의의 근간인 투표권을 보호하기 위한 노력이 왜 중요한지 성찰할 필요가 있다.

미국 대선과 중간선거의 향방을 가르는 스윙 스테이트(Swing States)는 단순히 표심이 요동치는 지역을 넘어, 미국 민주주의의 근간을 뒤흔드는 깊은 역사적 맥락과 정치적 역학을 담고 있다. 이 글에서는 애리조나와 미시간이라는 두 스윙 스테이트에서 벌어진 상반된 역사를 통해, 미국의 투표 방식과 정치적 권력 구조가 어떻게 형성되고 변화해왔는지 심층적으로 탐구한다. 한편에서는 ‘투표 통제’를 통해 권력을 공고히 하려는 상층부의 노력이, 다른 한편에서는 ‘풀뿌리 결집’을 통해 소외된 이들이 정치적 목소리를 내는 과정이 극명하게 대비된다. 이 두 가지 힘은 과거의 유산이 되어 오늘날까지도 미국 선거의 지형을 결정하는 데 중요한 역할을 하고 있다.

1986년, 윌리엄 렌퀴스트(William Rehnquist)의 미국 대법원장 인준 청문회는 그가 과거 애리조나 피닉스에서 벌였던 논란 많은 행동들로 인해 뜨거운 논쟁에 휩싸였다. 청문회의 가장 극적인 순간들은 그가 연방 대법원 부대법관으로 재임했던 14년의 경력과는 무관하게, 판사가 되기 훨씬 전인 1960년대 피닉스에 살던 시절의 사건들에 집중되었다.

목격자들은 당시 저명한 변호사였던 렌퀴스트가 1960년대 초 투표소에서 흑인 및 소수 인종 유권자들의 자격을 공개적으로 문제 삼았다고 증언했다. 이들은 렌퀴스트가 유권자들에게 헌법 구절을 읽어보라고 요구하는 등 사실상 문맹 테스트(literacy test)를 강요하며 투표를 방해했다고 주장했다. 한 목격자는 렌퀴스트가 한 흑인 신사에게 “실례합니다만, 당신은 자격을 갖춘 유권자입니까?”라고 묻자, “네”라는 답이 돌아왔다고 회상했다. 렌퀴스트는 “그렇다면 당신이 자격을 갖추었음을 보여줄 증명서가 있습니까?”라고 다시 물었고, 남성이 “없다”고 답하자 “그렇다면 당신의 자격에 의문이 있을 수 있겠군요”라고 말했다는 것이다. 또 다른 목격자는 렌퀴스트가 “카드를 읽어보라. 헌법에서 무언가를 읽어보라”고 요구했다고 증언했다.

청문회에서 렌퀴스트는 유권자를 괴롭히거나 위협했다는 주장을 완강히 부인했지만, 공화당원들에게 투표 자격 이의 제기에 대한 법률 자문을 제공했으며, 일부 경우에는 직접 투표소에 나타났음을 인정했다. 그는 이를 ‘선거일 프로그램(election day program)‘이라고 불렀지만, 다른 이들은 ‘투표 보안 프로그램(ballot security program)‘이라고 칭했다.

렌퀴스트의 대법원 인준을 위해 요청된 FBI 배경 조사는 이 사건에 대해 더 자세한 내용을 드러냈다. 보고서에 따르면, 피닉스의 공화당원들은 민주당 강세 지역, 특히 유색인종 커뮤니티에 우편물을 보내 반송될 경우 투표소에서 유권자 자격에 이의를 제기하는 전략을 사용했다. 1962년 11

이러한 상황은 전 세계적인 에너지 가격 상승과 경제적 고통으로 이어질 가능성이 크다. 사우디아라비아는 원유 수출이 경제의 근간을 이루므로, 후티 반군과의 재전쟁이나 외교적 해결책 모색 등 어려운 선택에 직면해 있다. 미국은 사우디아라비아의 동맹임에도 불구하고 후티 반군과의 전쟁에 직접 개입하기를 꺼리고 있는데, 이는 과거의 실패한 군사 개입 경험과 이란과의 전쟁으로 인한 과도한 부담 때문으로 보인다. 따라서 소비자들은 당분간 고유가 시대가 지속될 가능성에 대비해야 하며, 이 전쟁의 장기적인 여파는 유가 상승뿐만 아니라 예멘의 인도주의적 위기를 심화시키는 등 전 세계적으로 복잡하고 지속적인 영향을 미 미칠 수 있다는 점을 인지해야 한다.

지난 몇 달간 전 세계를 강타한 유가 급등은 많은 이들에게 의문을 안겨주었습니다. 특히 미디어에서 중동 분쟁에 대한 보도가 잦아들었음에도 불구하고, 갑작스러운 휘발유 가격 인상은 플로리다의 한 주유소 사장부터 멀리 떨어진 중동의 전문가까지 모두를 혼란에 빠뜨렸습니다. 뉴욕타임즈 팟캐스트 ‘더 데일리’는 이 미스터리를 파헤치기 위해, 갑작스러운 유가 폭등의 배경과 그 이면에 숨겨진 복잡한 지정학적 역학 관계를 심층 분석했습니다.

이야기는 플로리다의 한 주유소 사장 캠 주디(Cam Judy)로부터 시작됩니다. 그는 지난 3월, 이란과의 전쟁이 시작된 지 한 달쯤 되었을 때, 휘발유 가격이 갤런당 3.99달러에 머물기를 바라며 “다음 주에 전쟁이 끝나고 갤런당 2.79달러로 돌아갔으면 좋겠다”고 말했습니다. 당시에는 전쟁 발발로 인한 유가 인상이 어느 정도 예상되는 상황이었습니다.

하지만 몇 달 후, 캠은 예상치 못한 상황에 직면합니다. 어느 수요일 오후까지 갤런당 3.99달러를 유지하던 휘발유 가격이, 다음 날 아침 주유소를 열자마자 갤런당 4.19달러로 20센트나 급등한 것입니다. 그는 맥주 유통업자로부터 다른 주유소들이 모두 4.19달러로 올랐다는 소식을 듣고는 믿을 수 없었습니다. “말도 안 돼. 어제는 3.99달러였는데.” 그러나 직접 확인해보니 주변의 모든 주유소가 실제로 4.19달러로 가격을 인상한 것을 알게 되었습니다.

캠은 고객들의 반응을 이렇게 전했습니다. “모든 사람들의 입에서 나온 말은 단 하나였어요. ‘도대체 기름값에 무슨 일이 벌어지고 있는 거죠?’” 그는 고객들에게 답을 해줄 수 없어 가장 힘들었다고 말합니다. 지난번 유가 인상은 중동 분쟁이라는 명확한 이유가 있었지만, 이번에는 달랐습니다. 최근 뉴스에서는 중동 분쟁이 크게 다뤄지지 않았고, 사람들은 전쟁에 대해 잊어가고 있었기 때문입니다. 캠은 평범한 시민으로서, 하룻밤 사이에 20센트가 급등한 구체적인 원인을 알고 싶어 했습니다.

캠의 질문에 답하기 위해 뉴욕타임즈의 비비안 네림(Vivian Nerim) 기자는 사우디아라비아 리야드에서 유가 급등의 근본 원인을 파헤쳤습니다. 그녀는 많은 이들이 호르무즈 해협(Strait of Hormuz)의 봉쇄가 유가 상승의 원인이라는 것을 이해하고 있지만, 미국과 이란 간의 교착 상태가 몇 달간 지속되었음에도 불구하고 왜 지금 갑작스러운 유가 급등이 발생했는지에 대한 의문을 제기합니다.

핵심은 사우디아라비아에 있었습니다. 사우디아라비아는 오랫동안 세계 최대의 원유 수출국이며, 유가 변동에 가장 큰 영향을 미치는 국가입니다. 이란과의 전쟁 초기, 호르무즈 해협이 사실상 봉쇄되었을 때, 사우디아라비아는 지리적 이점을 활용한 독특한 ‘우회로(workaround)‘를 가지고 있었습니다. 바로 사우디아라비아 횡단 송유관(cross-kingdom pipeline)이었습니다.

이 송유관은 사우디 전역을 가로질러 홍해(Red Sea)로 이어져, 호르무즈 해협을 거치지 않고도 원유를 글로벌 시장에 수출할 수 있게 해주었습니다. 이 덕분에 사우디아라비아의 원유 공급은 다른 걸프 국가들보다 전쟁의 영향을 덜 받았습니다. 그러나 지난 몇 주 동안 모든 것이 바뀌었습니다. 이란의 동맹인 예멘의 후티 반군(Houthis)이 이 우회로에 대한 공격에 집중하기 시작하면서, 사우디아라비아의 유일한 안전한 원유 수출 통로가 위험에 처하게 된 것입니다.

그렇다면 갑작스러운 유가 급등의 배후에는 누가 있을까요? 바로 이란의 지원을 받는 예멘의 후티 반군입니다.

후티 반군은 예멘 북부에서 시작된 소규모 종교 운동이었으나, 2014년부터 점차 중요한 정치 세력으로 부상했습니다. ‘아랍의 봄’ 이후 예멘의 혼란스러운 정세 속에서 후티 반군은 수도 사나(Sana’a)를 장악하고 국제적으로 인정받던 정부를 남쪽으로 몰아냈습니다. 이에 사우디아라비아는 2015년 후티 반군과 싸우고 정부를 복원하기 위해 예멘 내전에 개입했으나, 처참한 결과를 낳았습니다. 이 잔혹한 내전은 2022년 유엔(UN)의 중재로 휴전이 성립되기 전까지 교착 상태에 빠졌습니다.

휴전 이후에도 후티 반군은 예멘 내에서의 정치적 입지 강화와 석유 자원 접근에 대한 좌절감에 시달리고 있었습니다. 이들은 자신들의 권력을 인정하고 석유 자원에 대한 접근권을 제공할 정치적 합의를 간절히 원했습니다.

동시에 이란 내부에서는 미국과의 전쟁을 확대해야 한다고 주장하는 강경파(hardliners)의 영향력이 커지고 있었습니다. 이들은 전 세계 경제, 특히 글로벌 에너지 시장에 대한 압력을 높여 트럼프 행정부를 압박하고자 했습니다.

결과적으로 예멘 내 정치 상황에 좌절한 후티 반군의 이해관계와 전쟁 확대를 원하는 이란 강경파의 이해관계가 맞아떨어지면서, 중동 정세는 새로운 국면을 맞이하게 됩니다.

이러한 상호 이익의 충돌은 지난 몇 달간 사우디아라비아와 후티 반군 간의 긴장을 극적으로 고조시켰습니다.

지난 7월, 후티 반군은 사우디아라비아에 대한 해상 봉쇄를 선언하고 홍해를 통과하는 사우디 선박의 통행을 막겠다고 위협했습니다. 사우디아라비아는 이에 맞서 예멘에 대한 공습을 시작했으나, 전면전으로 확대되는 것을 경계하는 듯했습니다. 그러나 후티 반군은 이에 굴하지 않고 지난주 홍해 연안으로 진격하기 시작했습니다. 그들은 바브엘만데브 해협(Bab al-Mandab Strait)의 입구에 위치한 예멘 영토의 전략적 요충지들을 장악했습니다. 바브엘만데브 해협은 홍해 입구에 있는 매우 중요한 해협으로, 예멘에게도 중요하지만 사우디아라비아의 원유 수출 ‘우회로’에도 결정적인 영향을 미치는 곳입니다.

그리고 지난 목요일과 금요일, 상황은 급변했습니다. 정부군이 빠르게 후퇴하면서 후티 반군은 홍해 연안의 광대한 영토를 장악하고 바브엘만데브 해협의 통제권을 확보했습니다.

엎친 데 덮친 격으로, 후티 반군이 이 핵심 해협을 장악한 바로 그 금요일, 사우디아라비아는 원유 수출에 의존해왔던 핵심 동서 송유관(East-West pipeline)이 공격받아 폐쇄될 수밖에 없다고 발표했습니다. 이 파이프라인은 호르무즈 해협 문제가 발생할 경우를 대비한 사우디의 주요 우회로였습니다.

이제 아라비아반도에서 원유를 수출할 수 있는 모든 통로가 심각하게 봉쇄되거나 아예 차단된 것입니다. 호르무즈 해협과 바브엘만데브 해협은 이란과 그 동맹국들의 통제하에 놓였고, 사우디의 횡단 송유관마저 공격을 받아 작동 불능 상태가 된 것입니다. 이 모든 사태는 사우디아라비아가 원유를 글로벌 시장에 공급할 수 있는 사실상 모든 ‘좋은 선택지’를 빼앗아 갔습니다.

사우디아라비아에게 이는 단순한 문제가 아닌 ‘존립 문제’입니다. 사우디 경제 전체가 석유와 석유화학 산업에 의존하고 있으며, 정부 예산과 왕실 구성원들에 대한 지급금 역시 석유 수입에 달려 있습니다. 석유 의존도를 줄이고 관광 및 비즈니스 허브로 변모하려는 노력조차 막대한 석유 수입을 바탕으로 한 투자에 기대고 있습니다. 만약 원유를 글로벌 시장에 내보낼 방법을 찾지 못한다면, 사우디아라비아에게는 정말 심각한 문제가 될 것입니다.

사우디아라비아가 취할 수 있는 선택지는 무엇일까요?

1. 후티 반군과의 재전(再戰): 군사적으로 후티 반군을 진압하는 방법입니다. 그러나 과거의 경험처럼 이는 사우디아라비아에게 매우 매력적이지 않은 선택지입니다. 막대한 비용과 실패의 위험이 따릅니다.
2. 외교적 해결책: 후티 반군과 정치적 합의를 통해 물러서도록 협상하는 방법입니다. 이 또한 쉽지 않습니다. 후티 반군은 매우 강경한 요구를 해왔으며, 지금처럼 우위를 점한 상황에서는 그들의 요구가 더욱 커질 것이기 때문입니다. 지속 가능한 합의에 도달할 것이라는 보장도 없습니다.

이러한 상황에서 사우디아라비아의 가장 강력한 동맹인 미국의 역할은 무엇일까요? 사우디아라비아는 후티 반군과의 단독 전쟁을 피하고 싶어 하기에, 미국과 다른 국제 파트너들의 지원을 간절히 바라고 있습니다. 사우디아라비아의 무함마드 빈 살만 왕세자(Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman)는 지난주에도 트럼프 행정부에 후티 반군과의 싸움에 동참해달라고 요청했습니다.

그러나 트럼프 대통령은 이를 거절한 것으로 알려졌습니다. 미국은 이미 이란과의 전쟁으로 과도하게 부담을 안고 있으며, 후티 반군과의 싸움에서 ‘승산 없는 일’로 판단하고 있습니다. 트럼프 대통령은 후티 반군이 미국과 싸우려는 것이 아니라 사우디아라비아와 싸우려 한다는 입장을 내비쳤습니다. 과거 미국의 후티 반군에 대한 공습 캠페인도 실패로 끝난 전례가 있습니다. 결국 미국은 사우디아라비아가 이 문제를 스스로 해결하도록 맡겨두는 태도를 보이고 있습니다.

리야드 현지에서 상황을 지켜보고 있는 비비안 네림 기자는 현재의 분위기를 “묘한 순간”이라고 표현합니다. 후티 반군의 공격이 수도 리야드까지 미치지 않고 주로 남부 지역에 집중되고 있기 때문에, 겉으로는 평온을 유지하려는 노력이 보인다는 것입니다. 컨퍼런스가 열리고 내년 관광 행사를 논의하는 등 일상생활이 이어지고 있지만, 모두가 잠재적인 전쟁의 위기에 놓여 있음을 인지하고 있습니다.

공격받은 송유관의 수리에는 얼마나 걸릴까요? 비비안 기자는 손상 정도에 따라 몇 주가 걸릴 수도 있다고 말합니다. 하지만 더 큰 문제는 수리 속도가 아니라, 지역 내 분쟁이 지속되고 적들이 파이프라인을 공격할 의지와 능력이 있는 한, 위험은 사라지지 않는다는 점입니다. “내일 수리해도 모레 또 공격받을 수 있습니다.”

미국과 이스라엘이 이란과 전쟁을 시작했을 때, 이란이 호르무즈 해협을 봉쇄할 가능성을 심각하게 받아들였어야 한다는 비판이 많았습니다. 그렇다면 사우디의 원유 수송로가 차단될 가능성도 예측 가능했던 일일까요? 비비안 기자는 전략적인 전문가라면 몇 달 전에도 충분히 예측할 수 있었던 시나리오라고 말합니다. 사우디아라비아, 쿠웨이트, 아랍에미리트 등 걸프 아랍 동맹국들은 이란이 미국에 보복 공격을 가할 경우, 자신들이 ‘최전선’이 될 것임을 항상 인지하고 있었습니다. 이들 국가에는 미군 기지가 있고, 미국 기업들이 사업을 하며, 그들의 에너지 자원은 세계 경제에 매우 중요하기 때문입니다. 이란이 멀리 떨어진 미국에 압력을 가하는 가장 전략적이고 쉬운 방법은 바로 이들 동맹국을 공격하는 것이었습니다. 그렇기에 많은 걸프 지도자들이 애초에 이 전쟁을 막으려 노력했던 것입니다.

플로리다의 주유소 사장 캠 주디의 우려는 현실이 되고 있습니다. 유가 급등은 이 전쟁의 수많은 결과 중 하나일 뿐입니다. 하지만 비비안 기자는 캠과 다른 사람들이 지금보다 더 큰 고통에 대비해야 할 수도 있다고 경고합니다. 전쟁 초기, 사우디아라비아의 ‘우회로’는 전쟁이 유가에 미치는 실제 비용을 가려왔지만, 이제 그 상황은 변했습니다.

더욱이 예멘에서는 수천만 명의 사람들이 이미 세계 최악의 인도주의적 위기를 겪고 있는 상황에서, 다시 전면전으로 치닫는 것은 비극적인 결과를 초래할 수 있습니다. 미국과 이란 간의 이 전쟁은 전 세계적으로 경제와 에너지 비용, 그리고 사람들의 삶의 질에 파괴적인 영향을 미 미치고 있습니다. 이러한 문제들은 결코 쉽게 사라지지 않을 것이며, 복잡하고 장기화될 가능성이 높습니다. 유가가 배럴당 100달러를 넘어섬에 따라, 프랑스에서는 어부들이 연료 저장소를 봉쇄하려 경찰과 충돌했고, 포르투갈에서는 운전자들이 주요 정유소로 가는 도로를 막았습니다. 시리아에서는 정부가 2주 만에 두 번째로 연료 가격을 인상하자 시위대가 불타는 타이어로 주요 고속도로를 봉쇄하기도 했습니다.

중동의 복잡한 지정학적 상황은 단순히 먼 나라의 이야기가 아니라, 플로리다의 한 주유소에서부터 전 세계 시민들의 삶에 직접적인 영향을 미치고 있습니다.